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Find Out Who Your Friends Are: A Framework for
Determining Whether Employees' Social Media
Followers Follow Them to a New Job
No crevice of society remains untouched by the pervasiveness of
social media-including the workplace. Every day, employers and
employees become more skilled at cultivating an online network of
followers and then turning those contacts into dollars. Employees
increasinglyuse social media accounts to expand their business activities,
be it the journalist who breaks news on Twitter or the realtor who
advertises open houses on Facebook. While the ever-expanding use of
social media in the course of employment provides immeasurable benefits
to both the employer and employee alike, it also creates more problems.
Perhaps chief among them: Whose account is it? Whereas employers and
departing employees used to fight over the rolodex, they now jockey over
the password that delivers direct access to thousands of business contacts.
While password disputes are beginning to trickle into courts across
the country, earlyjurisprudence on the issue is wildly inconsistent. Before
the floodgates ofprofessional social media account litigation open, courts
need to adopt a framework that resolves disputes consistently and fairly.
This Comment suggests that the license agreements underlying social
media accounts should constitute personalproperty. Then, the Comment
provides a two-step approach for determining whether the employer or
employee is the real licensee of the account and, therefore, receives the
property rights that attach to the license.
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INTRODUCTION

Renowned ESPN NFL reporter Adam Schefter has nearly 6 million
Twitter followers.' Schefter has certainly worked hard to cultivate such a
large following. He has spent his entire professional career earning the
trust of valuable sources and works tirelessly to exchange information with
NFL insiders who provide the substance of his reports.2 The preeminent
NFL reporter frequently communicates on two phones at once and rarely,
1. Adam Schefter (@AdamSchefter), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/AdamSchefter
[https://perma.cc/XEW3-U333].
2. See Rick Maese, Adam Schefter is NFL Reporting Machine, WASH. POST (Sept. 2,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/adam-schefter-is-nfl-reportingmachine/2014/09/02/93e009f2-32cc-11e4-9f4d-24103cb8b742_story.htmI [https://perma.cc/
4RQM-QU8M].
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if ever, takes vacation.3 Yet, it is a near-certainty that Schefter would have
far fewer followers without the ESPN name in his biography. Other
significant NFL reporters such as FOX's Jay Glazer and Sports
Illustrated's Peter King, for example, have 1.09 million and 1.82 million5
followers, respectively.
Now, suppose Schefter leaves ESPN and signs with a competing news
outlet when his contract expires. Who retains access to those followers? 6
Both ESPN and Schefter have substantial interests in the account. For
ESPN, the account represents direct access to 6 million football fans who
may click on links to its website7 or tune into ESPN programming after
seeing a post promoting the network.' ESPN would be justified in
believing that the Twitter account was part of the employee's work created
within the scope of his employment. This could give it the superior claim
under the copyright work-made-for-hire doctrine. 9 On the other side of the
coin, Schefter's large following allows him to negotiate for a higher wage
or even send out endorsements for sponsors, 0 rendering the account
potentially lucrative.
Schefter also has a compelling claim to the
account-it is an extension of his personality and the fruits of his labor, not
all of which his employment necessarily requires.
This hypothetical conflict is becoming reality in offices across the
country.
In the modem workplace, employers are encouraging or
expecting their employees to maintain social media presences." The chief
3. Id.
4. Jay Glazer (@JayGlazer), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/JayGlazer [https://perma.cc/
RAS4-G53J].
5. Peter King (@SI PeterKing), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/SIPeterKing [https://
perma.cc/V9BB-2TAG ].
6. Of course, this question assumes the parties have not contracted to an assignment of
rights.
7. See, e.g., Adam Schefter (@AdamSchefter), TWITTER (Aug. 5, 2016, 6:34 AM),
https://twitter.com/AdamSchefter/status/761510581484400641
[https://perma.cc/V862J5D2] (sharing an ESPN link on his Twitter account).
8. See, e.g., Adam Schefter (@AdamSchefter), TWITTER (Aug. 4, 2016, 8:49 PM),
https://twitter.com/AdamSchefter/status/761363389050458112
[https://perma.cc/Q6NBDWLK].
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
10. Timothy Burke, Pro-Domino's Pizza Tweets from Adam Schefter & Chris
Mortensen Were-You Guessed It-Ads, DEADSPIN (Jan. 5, 2016, 2:45 PM), http://deadspin.
com/pro-dominos-pizza-tweets-from-adam-schefter-chris-mor-1751177008
[https://perma.
cc/L378-PCE9].
11. See, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 12, 2013) ("As time passed, it became the policy for Edcomm not only to urge
employees to create LinkedIn accounts, but also to become involved in the account
content.").
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executive officers of companies use LinkedIn to foster relationships with
clients' 2 or Twitter to keep the public abreast of their developments.13
Further down the chain of command, salesmen pitch products on Facebook
accounts, and public relations directors carefully groom corporate Twitter
profiles. More and more companies are hiring employees for the exclusive
purpose of running their social media accounts from behind the curtain.1 4
Yet, some things about the employment relationship never change.
Employers and employees will always split for sundry reasons. The only
difference is that now, the fight over the rolodex becomes the fight over the
password.
Disputes over the rights to use social media accounts are beginning to
creep into caselaw.'5 But, so far, the outcomes have been inconsistent, if
not entirely contradictory. This Comment explores the property interests
that employers and employees have in professional social media accounts
and suggests one framework for resolving the conflicts surrounding those
interests.
Part I explains three of the most prominent social media
platforms that professionals frequently use, the value of a social media
connection, and why this issue is so disputed. Part II discusses the body of
caselaw that is beginning to form in this area and explains the need for
consistency moving forward. Part III proposes a framework that courts
should adopt when addressing disputes over the access to social media
accounts.

12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (July 20, 2016, 5:57 PM),
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/755929747763245061
[https://perma.cc/5EGY-B5A9]
(describing the "Tesla Master Plan, Part Deux").
14. See Social Media Manager Jobs, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/socialmedia-manager-jobs [https://perma.cc/FF8D-DBUP]. On March 17, 2017, a search for
"Social Media Manager" yielded 1,080 results under job openings in the United States on
LinkedIn. Id.
15. See, e.g., In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015); Mattocks v.
Black Entm't Television LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014); Eagle, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34220.
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I. SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS: WHAT THEY ARE AND HOW THEY ARE
REPLACING THE ROLODEX

A.

Common Social Media Platforms

From anecdotal observation, professionals most commonly use three
social media platforms: Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn.16
1.

Facebook

Currently, Facebook is the world's preeminent social media
platform.' 7 The number of users-1.23 billion people used Facebook on a
daily basis during December 2016-indicates how Facebook is engrained
in modem society." Individual users engage with the platform by creating
profiles that reflect their identities where they post photos, publish personal
information, and generally create an online community with their friends
and family.1 9 Facebook users "friend" one another, thereby allowing them
to access the information on each other's profiles and view the posts that
each user makes.2 0
An individual's use of Facebook differs from the commercial use of
the platform, though. Facebook has drawn a line in the sand between
individual users and business users by developing the "Pages" feature.21
Whereas individual users create and manage personal accounts, business
users develop Pages.22 A Page is a free, easy way for companies to
generate brand exposure and leads, and many companies have reaped the

16. Instagram is also a frequently-used platform; however, again anecdotally speaking,
it is better utilized for advertising than it is to convey messages or reach clients and
customers. Further, Instagram is often accessed through Facebook and Twitter posts.
17. Richard A. Gershon, Facebook: A Business Perspective on the Power of Intelligent
Networking and Social Media, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MEDIA MANAGEMENT: VALUE
CHAIN AND BUSINESS MODELS IN CHANGING MEDIA MARKETS 375, 387 (Mike Friedrichsen
& Wolfgang Miihl-Benninghaus eds., 2013), http://ayorek.org/files/References/Hand
book%20fo2OSocial%/`2OMedia%/20Management_%/`2OValue%/`2OChain%/`20and%/o2OBus.p
df [https://perma.cc/7T4H-9PYJ].

18. Company Info,

FACEBOOK

NEWSROOM,

http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/

[https://perma.cc/H434-2EEW].
19. See Your Profile and Settings, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/239070709801747?helpref-popular topics [https://perma.cc/29XG-6Q6B].
20. Friending,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1540345696275090
[https://perma.cc/K4GB-B5JJ].
21. Pages, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/282489752085908
[https://
perma.cc/QPC5-V4AL] ("Pages are for brands, businesses, organizations and public figures
to create a presence on Facebook, whereas profiles represent individual people.").

22. See id.
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benefits of establishing a Facebook presence through this feature. 23 Any
Facebook user can "like" a Page, and, subsequently, posts from that Page
will appear on the user's homepage.24 Additionally, users who "like" the
Page can engage with the company by making comments on the Page,
sharing the Page's posts, and sometimes even sending private messages to
the administrators of that Page. 2 5 Through the ability to have direct
conversations with users, advertise, and create a brand identity through
communications, the Pages feature gives companies a litany of tools to
engage with clients and customers.2 6
Given its immense popularity, it is no surprise that Facebook is a key
tool for companies of all sizes. By late 2015, more than 50 million
businesses were using Facebook Pages.27 At that time, users were posting
2.5 billion comments on business Pages each month.28
Before individual users can register and access their accounts, they
must accept a Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, which sets out the
terms of the relationship between Facebook and the user.29 Through those
terms, Facebook reserves the right to terminate a user's access to an
account if the user violates the terms or creates "risk or possible legal
exposure." 3 0 The terms place limits on how users can act on Facebook,
such as prohibiting users from using their accounts "primarily for [their]
own commercial gain." 3 ' Business users forming Pages must also accept a
separate Terms agreement before creating their Pages.32 Incorporated into
the Pages Terms is the same Statement of Rights and Responsibilities that

23. See, e.g., Real Businesses. Real Results.,
business/success/ [https://perma.cc/6WAD-LCNY].

FACEBOOK,

https://www.facebook.com/

24. Pages,supra note 21.
25. See Like and Interact with Pages, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/ 1771297453117418/ [https://perma.cc/2DPQ-EHFH].
26. See
Facebook Pages,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/business/
products/pages [https://perma.cc/RH9Z-GJHA].
27. Kathleen Chaykowski, Number of Facebook Business Pages Climbs to 50 Million
With New Messaging Tools, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2015, 3:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kathleenchaykowski/2015/12/08/facebook-business-pages-climb-to-50-million-with-ne
w-messaging-tools/#73lb6Olclc2c [https://perma.cc/3XJZ-723Z].

28. Id.
29. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/legal/terms [https://perma.cc/5KG5-K6HT] (last updated Jan. 30, 2015).
30. Id. ("[W]e can stop providing all or part of Facebook to you.").
31. Id. ("You will not use your personal timeline primarily for your own commercial
gain, and will use a Facebook Page for such purposes.").
32. See Facebook Pages Terms, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/page
guidelines.php [https://perma.cc/LTJ9-TW7B] (last updated Mar. 30, 2017).
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applies to individual users.33 Though Facebook does not expressly identify
the legal relationship it attaches to accounts and Pages, the agreements for
both individual account users and Pages users likely constitute licenses to
use the Facebook platform.3 4 Two terms are particularly pertinent to the
subject matter of this Comment: (1) "You will not share your
password .. ., let anyone else access your account, or do anything else that
might jeopardize the security of your account," and (2) "[y]ou will not
transfer your account (including any Page or application you administer) to
anyone without first getting our written permission." 35
2.

Twitter

Twitter is a social media platform through which users create
posts-called "Tweets"-limited to 140 characters or fewer.36 Other users
can "follow" the account, which means that every time the account posts a
new Tweet, that Tweet will show up on the follower's homepage. 37 Users
can unfollow an account at any time, meaning they unsubscribe from that
33. See id.
34. See generally Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting
Around Statutory Protection ofIntellectualProperty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 93, 98 (2006)
("A license is a contract between two parties, one of whom owns intellectual property (the
licensor) that the other (the licensee) wishes to use. A licensee ... may only use the
intellectual property in the manner allowed by the license." (footnote omitted)). The terms
agreement could modernly be classified as a point-and-click agreement, which is "[a]n
electronic version of a shrinkwrap license in which a computer user agrees to the terms of an
electronically displayed agreement by pointing the cursor to a particular location on the
screen and then clicking." Point-and-ClickAgreement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). Though identifying online contracts by a uniform name has proven difficult, the
majority of such contracts contain terms that constitute a license:
Computer information contracts are "licenses." The standard terms of these
licenses set out what the parties contracting for the information, i.e., the licensees,
may do with it. Typically these licenses limit the number of users the licensee
may permit to use the information, restrict the uses that the licensee may put the
information to, and control the circle of recipients to whom the licensee may
distribute the information.
James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European
Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 109, 111 (2003). See also MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, SOFTWARE
LICENSING, CLOUD COMPUTING AGREEMENTS, OPEN SOURCE, AND INTERNET TERMS OF USE:

A

PRACTICAL APPROACH TO INFORMATION AGE CONTRACTS IN A GLOBAL SETTING

442

(2016-2017 ed. 2016) ("The vast majority of wrap contracts are standard form licenses

defined in Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA) as transactions
targeting a broad market.").
35. Statement ofRights and Responsibilities,supra note 29.
36. New

User FAQs, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/13920

[https://

perma.cc/KZ8Z-BRZH].
37. Id.
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account and will no longer see any of its Tweets unless the users access
them directly. 38 An account can be private or public. 39 If the account is
public, any person using the Internet can access the account and view every
Tweet it has ever posted.40 If the account is private, then only approved
users can read Tweets sent from the account. 41
While Twitter has fewer global users than Facebook, the amount of
users who regularly engage with the platform is still staggering. As of May
2016, Twitter users had created 1.3 billion accounts, with 310 million of
those accounts active monthly.42 According to Brandwatch, 65.8% of
companies in the United States with more than 100 employees use Twitter
accounts for marketing.43 The average Twitter user follows roughly five
businesses.44 Customer service conversations on Twitter are increasingly
common, and "[c]ompanies using Twitter for customer service see a 19%
lift in customer satisfaction." 4 5 As a result, more than 90% of companies
Tweet daily.46
When users first create an account, they must agree to Twitter's Terms
of Service, which creates a license to use the Twitter software per the
express terms of the agreement.47 According to the Terms, Twitter may
"suspend or terminate your account or cease providing you with all or part
of the Services at any time for any or no reason." 48
Unlike Facebook, Twitter does not have a separate platform
particularly for business users, but it does envision that some users will
register Twitter accounts through the scope of their employment. Under

38. Unfollowing People on Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/I15355
[https://perma.cc/6X9J-28TA].
39. See New User FAQs, supra note 36.

40. See id.
41. About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/
articles/14016 [https://perma.cc/G9F8-6S6N].
42. Kit Smith, 44 Twitter Statisticsfor 2016, BRANDWATCH (May 17, 2016), https://
www.brandwatch.com/2016/05/44-twitter-stats-2016/ [https://perma.cc/NR6U-ESD7].

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id.
47. Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos?lang-en [https://
perma.cc/R2CS-UG95] ("Twitter gives you a personal, worldwide, royalty-free, nonassignable and non-exclusive license to use the software provided to you as part of the
Services. This license has the sole purpose of enabling you to use and enjoy the benefit of
the Services as provided by Twitter, in the manner permitted by these Terms."). This
classification by Twitter seems appropriate because such standard computer contracts are
best classified as licenses. See Maxeiner, supra note 34, at 111.
48. Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 47.
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the first section entitled "Who May Use The Services," the Terms provide
that "[i]f you are accepting these Terms and using the Services on behalf of
a company, organization, government, or other legal entity, you represent
and warrant that you are authorized to do so." 49

3.

LinkedIn

Linkedln is an online platform that allows professionals to create
virtual networks with other professionals and companies. 5 0 Users create
profiles that resemble an interactive r6sum6, which detail the user's job,
education, skills, experience, and interests.' Users can search for other
people and invite them to become a "connection," which is similar to a
friend on Facebook.52 Once two users are connected, they can message
each other, monitor developments in each other's careers, and interact with
posts that they each make. 53 Employers can create Company Pages, on
which they can give general information about their businesses, manage
groups of employees, post updates, and create connections with colleagues
and potential leads.54 Employers can also post job openings on the
platform, and individual users can search for such job openings and apply
directly through Linkedn.
Well over 400 million individuals use Linkedln, according to the
platform's official website.5 6 The platform proclaims that it is "the world's
largest professional network on the Internet. "5 Like Facebook and Twitter,
Linkedln users must agree to a User Agreement before using the website's
services. 8 Section 2.2 of the User Agreement seems to set out a clear rule
concerning ownership of an account: "[a]s between you and others, your
49. Id.
50. See How LinkedIn Can Help You, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/help/
linkedin/answer/45/how-linkedin-can-help-you?1ang-en [https://perma.cc/ZWB5-9YF3].
51. See Editing Your Profile, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/
topics/6042/6043 [https://perma.cc/W6VE-5U9R].
52. See Invitations, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/topics/6096/
6097 [https://perma.cc/R4G7-3B4Y].
53. See Contacting Connections, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/
topics/6073/6074 [https://perma.cc/HD9E-W37N].
54. See Creating a Linkedln Company Page, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/
help/linkedin/topics/6227/6228/710 [https://perma.cc/626M-UTWS].
55. See Posting a Job on Linkedln, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/help/
linkedin/topics/6317/6318/166 [https://perma.cc/F7MV-J56W].
56. About Us, LINKEDIN, https://press.linkedin.com/about-linkedin [https://perma.cc/
4MZA-3Y98].
57. Id.
58. See User Agreement, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement
[https://perma.cc/FVN8-U8BX].
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account belongs to you." 5 9 LinkedIn reserves the right to limit a user's use

or terminate an account entirely. 60 LinkedIn users lose the right to access
their accounts upon termination.6' Just as Facebook and Twitter grant users
licenses, the legal relationship between LinkedIn and account-holders
appears to be that of a licensor-licensee.62
4.

License Agreements UnderlieAll Three Major Social Media
Platforms

Based on an initial review of the use policies governing each social
media platform, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn all impliedly or expressly
compel users to enter into license agreements. Generally, a license is an
agreement between two parties in which a licensor permits a licensee to use
the licensor's property, but only on the terms specified in the contract. 63
While licenses spring from contracts,64 Part III of this Comment discusses
how property interests also inhere in them.65
B.

The Indefinite Value of a Social Media Connection

Professionals crave a strong social media presence. 6 6 A well-managed
social media account provides direct access to millions of people who
could become clients, customers, or valuable resources to career
development. Accordingly, there appears to be some monetary value
attached to each friend, follower, or connection. Few reliable studies have
addressed the exact valuation of such a connection, but courts have shown
59. Id.
60. Id. ("[Section] 3.4. Limits[:] LinkedIn reserves the right to limit your use of the
Services, including the number of your connections and your ability to contact other
Members. LinkedIn reserves the right to restrict, suspend, or terminate your account if
LinkedIn believes that you may be in breach of this Agreement or law or are misusing the
Services (e.g. violating any Do and Don'ts).").
61. Id.
62. This is particularly supported by LinkedIn's restriction on the account-holder's use
of the account. See supra text accompanying note 60.
63. See Winston, supranote 34, at 98.
64. See, e.g., McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(quoting Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed.
Cir. 1989)).
65. See generally Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not A "ContractNot To Sue
Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1101 (2013).
66. KENNETH OLMSTEAD, CLIFF LAMPE & NICOLE B. ELLISON, PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE WORKPLACE 5 (2015) ("78% of workers who use social media
platforms for work-related purposes say social media is useful for networking or finding
new job opportunities.").

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss2/8

10

Moore: Find Out Who Your Friends Are: A Framework for Determining Whethe

2017]

FIND OUT WHO YOUR FRIENDS ARE

503

a willingness to recognize some value-most notably in PhoneDog v.
Kravitz. 67

PhoneDog involved a dispute between a website-blog, PhoneDog, and
a former employee, Noah Kravitz.6 8 In April 2006, Kravitz created and
began operating a Twitter account with the name @PhoneDogNoah,
through which he promoted PhoneDog content and services. 69 The account
amassed approximately 17,000 followers during the course of Kravitz's
employment.70 In October 2010, Kravitz left the company and PhoneDog
requested he terminate use of the account. 7 ' Kravitz refused and instead
changed the account name to @noahkravitz. 72 PhoneDog brought action in
federal district court, alleging, inter alia, conversion and misappropriation
of trade secrets.73 PhoneDog alleged $340,000 in damages, calculated by
multiplying 17,000 followers by $2.50 per follower, then multiplying that
total, $42,500, by eight months.74 Kravitz moved to dismiss the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that PhoneDog could not meet
the $75,000 amount-in-controversy required when a case hinges on
diversity of citizenship.
The district court recognized the novelty of the
issues that PhoneDog raised, but it ultimately refused to dismiss the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding:
[w]hether PhoneDog has any property interest in the Twitter account
cannot be resolved on the record at this stage of the case. Likewise,
should PhoneDog be able to establish that it has some property interest in
the Twitter account or the password and follower list, the question becomes
what is the proper valuation of such items. Again, the parties have
proffered competing methodologies for valuing the account, and on this
limited record, the Court is unable to resolve this dispute at this juncture.

67. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011); see also, e.g., Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., No. 10 C
7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014) (concluding that there
could have been a "marketable commercial interest" when a social media user "created her
Twitter and Facebook accounts for her own economic benefit, knowing that if she left her
employment . . she could promote another employer to her Twitter and Facebook
followers.").
68. PhoneDog, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *1.
69. Id. at *2-3.
70. Id. at *3.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *3, *8 (multiplying the value of the account's followers by eight months
because that is how long Kravitz used the account before PhoneDog filed its action).
75. Id. at *3-4.
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At the same time, PhoneDog has expressly alleged $340,000 in
damages stemming from its misappropriation and interference with
The Court cannot say that PhoneDog's
economic advantage claims.
allegation as to the amount in controversy is in bad faith or that it appears
beyond a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount. 76

While the court did not come close to deciding the proper valuation
for a follower, or even if PhoneDog would have a right to damages, it
dismissed outright the notion that there is absolutely no monetary value
attached to a follower.
The parties eventually settled without a final
resolution on these issues, and Kravitz retained custody of the account.7 1
The court's reluctance to dismiss the case in PhoneDog, along with
the uptick of social media cases on dockets, suggests that courts recognize

the financial implications of access to social media accounts. In cases like
PhoneDog, employers and employees are not quibbling over passwords in
vain. Access to an established account with a large following is a
legitimate asset.79
II. SOCIAL MEDIA DISPUTES TRICKLE INTO COURTS

The body of caselaw surrounding social media access disputes is
small, but it is growing. PhoneDog was a harbinger of more password
conflicts to come. In the five years since, state and federal courts across
the country have grappled with novel issues and arguments in this field.
Following is a discussion of several cases that have addressed the
hypothetical Schefter-ESPN Twitter account conflict in one way or
another. More specifically, this Part begins by addressing whether courts
have identified a property interest when adjudicating these cases.

76. Id. at *12-13.
77. See id.
78. Dispute Over Ownership of Twitter Account Settles, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
(Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.winston.com/en/privacy-law-comer/dispute-over-ownershipof-twitter-account-settles.html [https://perma.cc/FFT9-4L56].
79. Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account? A Trade Secret Approach to
Allocating Rights, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 201, 209-10 (2013) ("Social
network platforms began as sites for individual use, but an increasingly broad range of
organizations see participation in them as a necessity. Social network participation can
repay organizations with free access to vast numbers of people, amplification of
communication through network effects, consumer feedback, access to niche markets, and
enhanced brand loyalty. As a result, organizations increasingly attempt to engage with the
public not only by advertising on social network platforms, but also by creating social
network accounts and entering the conversation themselves." (footnote omitted)).
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PhoneDog, In re Borders, and Mattocks: Early Cases Identify Property
Interests, or a Lack Thereof in Social Media Accounts

Although the trial court in PhoneDog did not reach a final conclusion
on the employer's conversion claim, the court seemed to approach the
question as if the Twitter account at issue was, indeed, property that was
capable of being converted. 0
The employee moved to dismiss the
conversion claim, and the court denied the request, writing:

'

Mr. Kravitz first argues that PhoneDog has failed to sufficiently allege that
it owns or has the right to immediately possess the Account. PhoneDog,
however, maintains that it has adequately alleged that it was and still is the
owner of the Account and is entitled to possession of the Account. It points
out that it has alleged that it gave Mr. Kravitz permission to use the
Account during his employment, but he has refused to surrender the
Account following his departure from PhoneDog. At this stage of the
proceedings, the Court finds that PhoneDog has adequately alleged that it
owns or has the right to possess the Account. As discussed above, the
nature of that claim is at the core of this lawsuit and cannot be determined
on the present record. 8
In In re Borders Group, Inc., a bankruptcy court in 2011 declared that
social media accounts were assets that a seller group had to transfer to the
buyer, similarly placing social media accounts on the property side.8 2
Finding property interests in a social media account would seem to match
the modem judicial trend of finding that modem bits of technology, such as
Internet domain names, constitute items of personal property.8 3 However,
in Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television LLC, one of the earliest
social media cases litigated all the way through trial, a Florida federal
district court came down on the other side of that issue.8 4 In Mattocks, the

80. PhoneDog, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *26.
81. Id. at *26-27 (citations omitted).
82. In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 11-10614, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4606, at *37-38, *38
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011).
83. Argento, supra note 79, at 274 ("In some cases, courts have found that similar items
qualified as property and could be the subject of conversion. In Kremen v. Cohen, for
example, the Ninth Circuit held that, under California law, an internet domain name was
personal property for purposes of a conversion claim. Similarly, in Staton Holdings, Inc. v.
First Data Corp., the Northern District of Texas found that, under Texas law, a telephone
number could be subject to conversion as personal property. In general, the law appears to
be moving in the direction of finding intangible items such as domain names and phone
numbers to be personal property and subject to conversion." (footnotes omitted)). It should
be noted that in this article, Professor Argento was actually arguing that social media
accounts should not be treated as property. See id. at 273-78.
84. See Mattocks v. Black Entm't Television LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1321 (S.D.
Fla. 2014).
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plaintiff, a fan of the TV program The Game, created a Facebook Fan Page
to discuss the show.15
Black Entertainment Television (BET), the
defendant in the case, eventually hired the plaintiff on a part-time basis to
manage the Page. 86 BET encouraged its viewers to like the Page, placed its
logos and trademarks in various sections of the Page, and held editorial
control over what the plaintiff could and could not post." The plaintiff still
created most of the content on the Page, but other BET employees also
contributed." The two parties later signed a "Letter Agreement," under
which both the plaintiff and BET held administrative rights in the Page,
such that they both could update the Page at their own discretion.89 The
plaintiff also created a Twitter account to promote the show. 90
A year later, the relationship between the parties deteriorated when the
plaintiff informed BET that she would restrict BET's access to the account
until they entered into a full-time employment agreement. 9' The day after
conveying this message, the plaintiff removed administrative capabilities
from BET's users and took exclusive control of the Page once again. 92 In
response, BET sent a cease and desist letter to the plaintiff informing her
that she could no longer use BET's intellectual property.93 BET petitioned
Facebook to shut down the plaintiffs Page and Facebook obliged,
migrating the followers to a BET-owned Page and terminating the
plaintiffs account. 94 Similarly, BET successfully persuaded Twitter to
disable her account on that platform.95 The plaintiff brought an action
against BET alleging, inter alia, conversion and tortious interference with
the contractual relationships she had with Facebook and Twitter. 9 6 The
court granted summary judgment to defendant BET on the tortious
interference claim because an element of the tort is "the absence of any
justification or privilege," 9 7 and the court deemed BET justified in
85. Id. at 1315. The "Fan" Page was a subset of Facebook's Page platform; this
account was substantially similar to the type of account a business makes, rather than an
individual profile of the plaintiff. See id.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1315-16.
Id. at 1316.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1317.
Id. at 1316.
Id.
Id. at 1316-17.
Id. at 1317.

95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1318 (quoting U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Logus Mfg. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 2d. 1303,

1320 (S.D. Fla. 2012)).
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interfering.9 8 The court also granted BET summary judgment on the
conversion claim, stating:
Based on the record, Mattocks cannot establish that she owns a property
interest in the "likes" on the FB Page. As explained..., "liking" a
Facebook Page simply means that the user is expressing his or her
enjoyment or approval of the content. At any time, moreover, the user is
free to revoke the "like" by clicking an "unlike" button. So if anyone can
be deemed to own the "likes" on a Page, it is the individual users
responsible for them. Given the tenuous relationship between "likes" on a
Facebook Page and the creator of the Page, the "likes" cannot be converted
in the same manner as goodwill or other intangible business interests. 99
Thus, the district court in Mattocks refused to find any property
interest in an account.
Because courts do not know where to even begin when labeling the
entities in dispute, they have arrived at markedly different conclusions, in
turn spitting out a body of law that is wholly unclear and unreliable. The
reluctance to label a social media account as a piece of personal property is
a key factor in the unpredictability plaguing this body of law. For instance,
consider two of the major decisions that squarely apply to the
Schefter-ESPN hypothetical: Eagle v. Morgan'0 0 and In re CTLLI' 0
B.

Eagle v. Morgan: Denying PropertyInterests but ProtectingIndividual
Investment in Social Media Accounts

Eagle concerned a company executive's frequently used personal
Linkedln account.1 02 The plaintiff, Linda Eagle, co-founded the company
(Edcomm) with a man who felt strongly that Linkedln could be a valuable
sales and marketing tool.1 03 Thus, he pushed all employees to create and
actively manage Linkedln accounts.1 0 4 Edcomm did not pay for the

98. Id. at 1319 ("A defendant is not a 'stranger' to a business relationship if the
defendant 'has any beneficial or economic interest in, or control over, that relationship.'
Thus, a party cannot be liable for tortious interference 'when it has a supervisory interest in
how the relationship is conducted or a potential financial interest in how a contract is
performed.' . . . The record in this case shows conclusively that BET was not a 'stranger' to
Mattocks's user agreements with Facebook and Twitter." (citations omitted)).
99. Id. at 1321 (citations omitted).
100. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2013).
101. In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015).
102. See Eagle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *2-3.
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id
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LinkedIn accounts or require its employees to have accounts.' 0 5 However,
Edcomm believed the accounts were its property because it provided
guidelines for LinkedIn use.1 06 Further, employees registered LinkedIn
accounts with Edcomm e-mail domains, on Edcomm's computers, and with
Edcomm's permission. 0 7 Despite Edcomm's belief that it owned the
accounts, it did not contract with its employees to declare rights to their
LinkedIn accounts if the employees ever left the company.'s At least in
Eagle's case, Edcomm employees shared passwords so that a company
representative could respond to clients in a timely manner, even if the
account user was unavailable.1 09
Eagle, co-founder of the company, built a LinkedIn network of 4,000
contacts." 0 Conflict arose when Eagle's employment was terminated and
her co-workers changed her LinkedIn password, leaving her without access
to her contacts or messages."' In the days following Eagle's dismissal, the
most important information on her account-including the name, picture,
education, and experience-was changed to reflect Sandi Morgan, the
interim CEO and defendant in this case.11 2 The URL of the account did not
change, though, such that a Google search for Linda Eagle would still
direct users to the account.1 3 Trial testimony revealed that Eagle was
responsible for $6.6 million in sales one year, and more than 70% of her
sales came from existing contacts that she typically communicated with on
the LinkedIn platform. 114
In court, Eagle brought many claims against Edcomm, including the
tort of conversion."'5 On the conversion claim, the court ruled in favor of
defendant Edcomm, concluding: "[a]s the LinkedIn account is not tangible
chattel, but rather an intangible right to access a specific page on a
computer, [Eagle] is unable to state a cause of action for conversion."116
105. Id.
106. See id. at *4.
107. See id. at *5.
108. Id. at *6.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *11.
111. Id. at *6.
112. Id. at *8. Some portions of the profile, such as a section for honors and awards, still
reflected the information of Eagle. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *10.
115. Id. at *14.
116. Id. at *27-29 (concluding that the LinkedIn account was similar to "items such as
software, domain names, and satellite signals," and further that "'[w]hile courts in other
states have expanded the tort of conversion to apply to intangible property, in Pennsylvania
this expansion is limited 'to the kind of intangible rights that are customarily merged in, or

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss2/8

16

Moore: Find Out Who Your Friends Are: A Framework for Determining Whethe

2017]

FIND OUT WHO YOUR FRIENDS ARE

509

However, Eagle did succeed on three of her claims: (1) unauthorized use of
name, (2) invasion of privacy by misappropriation of identity, and
(3) misappropriation of publicity."'7
The court's reasoning on the
misappropriation of publicity claim is particularly interesting:
Plaintiff maintains an exclusive right to control the commercial value of her
name and to prevent others from exploiting it without permission. By
using Plaintiffs password to enter her Linkedln account, changing the
password to block Dr. Eagle from entering it, and then alteringher account
to reflect Sandi Morgan's information-in lieu of simply creating a new

LinkedIn account for Ms. Morgan-DefendantEdcomm deprived Plaintiff
of the commercial benefit of her name. As stated previously, as a result of
Edcomm's actions, a person who was specifically searching for
Dr. Eagle in connection with business opportunities would unwittingly be
directed to an Edcomm webpage with Sandi Morgan's name, picture, and
credentials. This result clearly provided promotional benefit for Edcomm
and constitutes the appropriation of a name for commercial use. Such
actions therefore rise to the level of tortious activity." 8
While this court did not deem Eagle the account owner-on the
grounds that nobody could own the account-it did seem to insinuate that it
would be unlawful for a company to seize the account and reap the benefit
that Eagle sowed under her own identity.
The facts of Eagle are more damning for the employer than most
scenarios because the profile still contained components of the plaintiffs
name and credentials. But, in a broader context, the company took a body
of work a former employee created and simply swapped out the user and
name on the account.119 This is the exact type of conduct any company
would engage in if it could gain the rights to a former employee's account.
Further, it would be difficult to completely expunge every trace of a user
from any account that the user actively manages.1 20 Courts could easily
lean on this determination to find that repurposing a former employee's
social media account for the company's benefit could amount to tort
liability against the company.

identified with, a particular document (for example, a deed or a stock certificate)."' (quoting
Giordano v. Claudio, 714 F. Supp. 2d 508, 524 (E.D. Pa. 2010))).
117. Id. at *50.
118. Id. at *23-24 (emphasis added).
119. See id. at *8.
120. Consider, for example, a salesman who posts Tweets advertising a service and
directing interested clients to send messages to his personal email address or phone number.
The identity of that employee is embedded into the account, and a website search for his
name could possibly turn up results for those Tweets sent from the account. These sorts of
digital fingerprints will accompany any social media account.
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Furthermore, the Eagle court actually found that the plaintiff could
have had a viable action for tortious interference of contract had she
properly alleged damages:
[T]he Court can reasonably infer from the existence of her account that
Plaintiff had in fact entered into a contractual relationship with Linkedln.
Moreover, Plaintiff has established that, by entering her account and
changing her password, Defendant Edcomm acted with purpose or intent to
harm Plaintiff by preventing that relationship from continuing. Edcomm
asserts that it had a privilege to enter Dr. Eagle's account under Edcomm's
policy that it "owned" its employees' Linkedln accounts and could "mine"
them for information upon departure of those employees. As set forth
above in the Findings of Fact, however, no such official policy existed.
Moreover, the Linkedln User Agreement clearly indicated that the
individual user owned the account.121
This finding adds to the body of law that favors the employee when
employers and employees battle over professional social media account
access. In sum, even though Eagle refused to recognize a property interest
in the social media accounts at issue, it seemed to favor protecting the
employee's interests in the account.

C.

In re CTLI: ProtectingEmployer Interests in Social Media Accounts

On the other hand, the bankruptcy court in In re CTLI disagreed with
Eagle on both the property question and the employer-employee
question.1 2 2 In that case, a man named Jeremy Alcede opened a firearms
store (the company) that eventually went into bankruptcy.1 2 3 Alcede
created and managed a Facebook Page entitled "Tactical Firearms."1 24
Alcede managed two Facebook accounts: a "friends page" that was his own
personal profile and a "likes page," the aforementioned Tactical Firearms
Page, 25 which he more affirmatively managed in his professional capacity
as the owner of the firearms store.1 2 6 As part of the bankruptcy action, the
court required the company to transfer its assets to the new owner.1 27
Specifically, the order required the company to deliver "possession and
control" of the password to the company's Facebook account to the new
121. Id. at *30.
122. See generally In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015). At the time
of the writing of this Comment, In re CTLI was one of the most recently published cases
that addressed social media interests as between an employer and a former employee.
123. Id. at 362.
124. Id. at 367.
125. Id. at 365.
126. See id. at 367-68.
127. Id. at 362.
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owner.1 28 Alcede refused to relinquish control of the account, arguing that
the account belonged to him personally and did not belong to the
company.1 29

The bankruptcy court in In re CTLI began its analysis by noting that
Texas courts had never determined whether social media accounts carry
property interests. 30 Then, the court discussed the disconnect between
other jurisdictions that considered the issue, noting Mattocks' holding that
an account holder could not have an ownership interest in revocable likes,
which contradicts In re Borders Group's and other courts' holdings that
social media accounts have property interests because they are tantamount
to subscriber lists.' 3 ' In reconciling the holdings of other courts with the
broad definition of property in the Bankruptcy Code, the court held that
"business social media accounts are property interests."13 2 The court found
the In re Borders Group line of reasoning more compelling than Mattocks,
stating: "[1]ike subscriber lists, business social media accounts provide
valuable access to customers and potential customers. The fact that those
customers and potential customers can opt out from future contact does not
deprive the present access of value."'3 3
However, the In re CTLI court ultimately considered the Page
property of the company and not the personal property of Alcede.1 3 4 The
court identified a number of factors that led to this determination: (1) the
company's name was the title of the Page, which raises the presumption
that it was the company's Facebook Page; (2) the Page was directly linked
to the company's website; (3) Alcede managed another personal page that
was separate from this page; (4) the majority of posts were "expressly
business-related;" (5) the profile was a Page and not an individual profile;
(6) Alcede shared the login information with a business associate; and
(7) the use of the Page was "clearly to generate revenues" for the store.135
Alcede made several arguments supporting that the profile was his personal

128. Id.
129. Id. at 363.
130. Id. at 366.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 366-67. The court noted that the "characterization of individual-asopposed
to business-social media accounts as property is much more difficult," but it ultimately
decided that an individual account likely falls under the persona interest and would be
categorized as property of the estate. Id. at 367.
133. Id. at 367 (noting further that federal law requires an opt-out process for subscriber
email lists, yet courts still consider those property, and therefore it is not determinative that
a "like" on Facebook is revocable).
134. See id. at 368.
135. Id.
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property, namely that he "started the page for personal reasons, used it to
share personal posts, and accessed it through his personal Profile."1 36 The
court recognized that the Page was likely an extension of Alcede's
personality, but it ultimately concluded that Alcede's claims were
insufficient to overcome the presumption that the account was the
company's asset and property.1 37 Instead of determining that Alcede had a
property interest, the court concluded "the proper way to characterize Mr.
Alcede's interest in the reorganized Debtor's social media accounts is an
interest in professional goodwill."1 38
D.

Inconsistency Reigns

In sum, the lower courts considering the social media ownership issue
have arrived at markedly different conclusions. The handful of litigated
cases mostly involved federal courts applying state law to a novel entity.
As a result, there is no certainty for employers and employees who wish to
bring social media disputes to the courts.
III. PROVIDING A WORKABLE FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE PASSWORD
DISPUTES

Turning toward the future of this area of law, uniformity requires
answers to two major questions: (1) whether a social media account
constitutes personal property, and (2) how to decide who has the superior
claim when two parties have interests in the account. This Comment
answers those two questions accordingly: (1) the license to use a social
media account is a piece of personal property, and (2) when the terms of
the agreement granting the license are ambiguous as to whom the license
runs, courts should adopt a framework similar to In re CTLI when
determining the identity of the licensee.
As to the question of whether the account is property, recall that the
underlying agreements of Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn all give users
licenses to use their platforms.1 3 9 Courts rarely hesitate to find property
interests in real and personal property licenses.1 40 It seems prudent to
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 373.
139. See supra Section I.A.4.
140. See, e.g., Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 334 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that there is
a property interest in a physician's license to practice medicine); In re Cent. Ark. Broad.
Co., 170 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994) (finding that a "broadcasting license is
valuable intangible property of [a bankruptcy] debtor's estate"); Nortel Networks Inc. v. Bd.
of Equalization, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905, 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("Intangible property
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extend that doctrine to include social media licenses. The analysis and
conclusion the bankruptcy court set forth in In re CTLI-grouping social
media accounts with valuable, intangible business property like subscriber
lists-provides a compelling rationale for attaching property interests to
social media accounts. The court's justifications for identifying a property
interest in the account are equally applicable to identifying a property
interest in the license to use the account; thus, the analysis arrives at the
same end.
Additionally, as discussed above, monetary value is attached to
followers, meaning an account that maintains a base of followers is an
asset.' 4 ' The users who create social media accounts hold most of the
rights included in the so-called property bundle of rights.1 4 2 They, of
course, can use and control their accounts.1 4 3 Users can exclude others
from accessing their accounts through password management.1 4 4 Users can
create and destroy their accounts at will.1 4 5

Although social media

platforms purport to prohibit the sale of an account,1 46 users are free to

includes a license to use information under a copyright or patent." (citing Preston v. Bd. of

Equalization, 19 P.3d 1148, 1161-63 (Cal. 2001))); Dodds v. Shamer, 663 A.2d 1318, 1324
(Md. 1995) ("Together, the characteristics of the executor's right, salability, assignability,
the protection from arbitrary prosecution, and the tangible representation of the privilege to
engage in the commerce of alcoholic beverages imbue liquor licenses with sufficient
attributes of property for us to hold that a liquor license is property .... ). In the context of
state-granted licenses, "the licensee maintains a property interest in a license prior to its
revocation." 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and Permits § 2 (2011).
141. See supra Section I.B.
142. See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a
Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 281, 284-85 (2002) ("The metaphor of property
as a bundle of rights dominates contemporary property law. The metaphor's image is a
bundle of sticks in which each stick in the bundle represents a different right associated with
property. Scholars disagree about precisely which rights the property bundle contains. The
rights most commonly identified with the property bundle include the right to exclude
others, the right to possess, the right to use, and the right to alienate (or transfer or dispose
of). Other rights that may be included in the property bundle are the rights to manage,
receive income, be secure, and maintain quiet enjoyment." (footnotes omitted)).
143. Though it is worth nothing that the terms agreement for most accounts dictate that
the platform has a right to terminate accounts, users have full use and control over the
accounts prior to revocation.
144. See, e.g., Account Security Tips, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/
76036# [https://perma.cc/Q5GG-NF32].
145. Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en [https://
perma.cc/R2CS-UG95] ("You may end your legal agreement with Twitter at any time by
deactivating your accounts and discontinuing your use of the Services.").
146. See, e.g., The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311
[https://perma.cc/K9P6-T3G7] ("You may not buy or sell Twitter usernames.").
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share passwords and transfer the right to use them.' 4 7 Social media users
can benefit from their accounts, be it through direct commercial
transactions or the development of goodwill or brand identity. Courts are
slowly beginning to recognize property interests in nontangible objects,'4 8
and they should soon accept that social media accounts are valuable entities
that deserve the same protections as real property and chattels.
Once courts consider social media accounts-or, more specifically,
the licenses to use them-property, the rest of the analysis flows easily.
The property interests in the license run to the owner of the license.1 4 9 That
just leaves the court to determine the question of fact: the identity of the
licensee.
At this point, the analysis depends on the terms of the social media
platform at issue. When the terms agreement is unambiguous, the licensee
is simply whomever the agreement identifies. However, when the terms
agreement is ambiguous, the court must implement a framework for finding
the true licensee.
A.

Unambiguous Terms: LinkedIn15 0

Courts routinely uphold online agreements,' 5 ' so if the agreement
clearly labels a specific licensee, the court must give effect to the terms.
LinkedIn's terms fall into this category. The language "[a]s between you
and others, your account belongs to you"1 52 is strong indicia of whom the

platform considers the licensee. This clause alone seems to foreclose the
idea that an individual user can create an account on behalf of a larger
entity, such as an employer. Another clause in the same section also
supports this proposition by specifically distinguishing the user from the

147. Some terms agreements purport to prohibit the sharing of passwords, but that is an
unenforceable provision in reality. See, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34220, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013) (illustrating one company's policy of all
employees sharing passwords so that they could maintain client communication even when
one employee was unavailable).
148. See Argento, supranote 79, at 274.
149. This is simple application of the fundamental property law concept that
'"[o]wnership' is a collection of rights to possess, to use, and to enjoy property, including
the right to sell and transmit it." 63C Am. JuR. 2D Property § 26 (2009).
150. This Comment sorts the social media platforms into "unambiguous" or
"ambiguous" groups based on the terms agreements that existed as of the time of writing. It
is possible the terms could change, so it is important to first look at the terms of the
particular platform to determine if they are unambiguous or ambiguous as to license
ownership.
151. See Rustad, supra note 34, at 443.
152.

User Agreement, supra note 58.
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employer: "Note that for Premium Services purchased by another party for
you to use (e.g. Recruiter seat bought by your employer), the party paying
for the Premium Service . . . may terminate your access to it.',153 These
terms clearly grant a license exclusively to the user who registers the
account and agrees to the terms.
Application of this framework to the facts of Eagle would show that
Eagle was the true licensee and owner of her LinkedIn account because she
was the one who created the account and assented to the terms agreement.
As such a property owner, Eagle should have been able to proceed on her
conversion claim.
B.

Ambiguous Terms: Facebook and Twitter

The terms agreements of Facebook and Twitter do not contain the
same precise language as the terms of LinkedIn. The closest Facebook
comes to labeling a particular licensee is between these two clauses: "You
will not share your password . . ., let anyone else access your account, or
do anything else that might jeopardize the security of your account," and
(2) "[y]ou will not transfer your account (including any Page or application
you administer) to anyone without first getting our written permission."1 54
These are restrictive terms, but they speak more to transferability than
ownership. Additionally, whereas LinkedIn specifically separates the user
from an employer, Facebook encompasses users who are administering
accounts, most likely as agents for larger entities. Under this ambiguous
terms agreement, the license could run to the individual user or the
company on whose behalf the individual is creating the account.
Twitter's terms are even less helpful. Its agreement specifically
permits users to register accounts on behalf of companies. 5 5 There are no
other terms expressly identifying to whom Twitter is giving a license.
Accordingly, as with Facebook, the licensee could be an individual user or
an employer.
Identifying the true licensee for such ambiguous accounts becomes a
question of fact. To aid in this inquiry, courts should adopt a framework
similar to that used in In re CTLI.1 56 The court in that case used a two-step
approach. 5' 7 First, it looked at (1) the title of the page, (2) the type of page,

153. Id. ("[Section] 2.2 Your Membership.") (emphasis added).
154. Statement ofRights and Responsibilities,supra note 29.
155. Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 47 ("If you are accepting these Terms and
using the Services on behalf of a company, organization, government, or other legal entity,
you represent and warrant that you are authorized to do so.").
156. See In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015).

157. See id. at 368, 372.
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and (3) the link between the page and the company's website, finding a
presumption of company property because the title was the name of the
company and the account was a formal Page rather than an individual
profile. 5
For the second part of the analysis, the court looked at the
content and the use of the profile to determine if the employee could
overcome that presumption.1 59 When determining whether the employee
met that burden, the court considered the following factors: (1) whether the
employee operated a separate, personal page, (2) whether the majority of
the posts were business-related, (3) whether multiple people within the
company shared access to the profile, and (4) whether the use of the page
was for the intended benefit of the company instead of the individual.1 60
For practical purposes, this proposed framework is applicable to the
hypothetical conflict at the beginning of this Comment.16' Adam Schefter's
Twitter account is titled in his own name, and because Twitter does not
differentiate its type of pages, it is the same type of page operated by all
users. Therefore, the presumption is that Schefter is the true licensee. To
turn an eye to the content and the use of the account, Schefter does not
operate a separate account, which suggests it is employee property under
the first factor. The Tweets are primarily Schefter's sports reports with
a few personal remarks sprinkled into the feed.1 62 There is also some
corporate product pitching.1 63 This would be a traditional mixed-use
account, but because the Tweets are mostly sent in Schefter's professional
capacity as a reporter, the second factor tends to favor the employer.
However, the Tweets appear to be sent exclusively by Schefter, and there is
no indication that any other ESPN employee can access his account.
Additionally, there is no indication that the Tweets are sent for the purpose
of generating revenue for ESPN, but rather to aid Schefter's individual
work. Accordingly, while the account does have some business-oriented
characteristics, there are insufficient facts to overcome the presumption that
the license to use the account is Schefter's property. Thus, if he and ESPN
part ways, Schefter should be able to retain control of his account. If ESPN

158. Id. at 372.
159. Id. at 368. The bankruptcy court actually approached these two steps in opposite
order, but it is clear that the court was testing whether the facts of the case could overcome
the presumption that arose through the official name of the account, stating: "[T]he evidence
is utterly insufficient to overcome the presumption that the Facebook Page entitled 'Tactical
Firearms' at the time of the Plan confirmation was anything other than what it appeared to
be: a business Facebook Page for the business known as Tactical Firearms." Id.

160. Id. at 368-72.
161. See supra Introduction.
162. See Schefter, supra note 1.

163. Id.
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were to then attempt to seize control of the Twitter account, Schefter could
bring a tort action.1 64

Applying this framework to Eagle 65 with tweaked facts would likely
result in a similar outcome. For the purposes of this hypothetical, pretend
Eagle's Linkedln account is actually a Facebook account that she similarly
used to message clients and build a community. Recall that in Eagle, the
name of the account was the employee's own.1 66 The type of account was
an individual account and not a type of account specifically designed for
corporate use.1 6 7 Therefore, there would be no presumption that the license
ran to the business instead of the individual user. The use of the account
was likely primarily commercial.1 68 Multiple users from the company
accessed it,1 69 and a large amount of the communications on the account
was in the course of making sales to clients.1 70 However, the information
contained within the account was all Eagle's personal information,171 and
she presumably also used the account for her own personal connections.
Though this would be a close call, the facts of the case would likely be
insufficient to overcome the presumption that the license belongs to Eagle.
As such, she would have been able to proceed on a conversion claim.
The Mattocks1 72 case, too, presents an enlightening fact pattern for
application of this framework. First, decide to whom the presumption of
license ownership should be given. The exact title of the Facebook Fan
Page is not disclosed in the court order, but it appears the title had some
164. Which cause of action governs password disputes is another issue of social media
law that needs resolution. A cause of action sounding in conversion should be the most
applicable once courts recognize property interests in the account. See Courtney W. Franks,
Comment, Analyzing the Urge to Merge: Conversion ofIntangible Propertyand the Merger
Doctrine in the Wake of Kremen v. Cohen, 42 Hous. L. REv. 489, 491 (2005). States have
traditionally been hesitant to apply the common law conversion doctrine to intangible
property but are beginning to relax tangibility requirements. Id. at 493-94. Tortious
interference with the user agreement contract is another possible cause of action. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 766A (AM.

LAW INST.

1979) ("One who intentionally

and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry)
between another and a third person, by preventing the other from performing the contract or
causing his performance to be more expensive or burdensome, is subject to liability to the
other for the pecuniary loss resulting to him.").
165. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12,

2013).
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at *6.
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

*3.
*2.
*6.
*9-13.
*3.

172. Mattocks v. Black Entm't Television LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
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reference to The Game, the name of the TV show, instead of personal
Additionally, the account was
information identifying Mattocks.1 7 3
registered as a Fan Page, rather than a personal profile.1 74 It is unclear
whether there was a link between the actual BET website and the Page, but
BET did display its trademarks on the Page, encouraged viewers to like the
Page, and posted exclusive materials to the Page. 7 5
Based on the
business-aligned title, the form of account designated for business use, and
the strong ties between BET's central operations and the Page, the
presumption is that BET is the licensee.
Second, analyze the factors to see if Mattocks can overcome the
presumption. Going to the first factor, it is undisclosed whether Mattocks
operated a separate account, but there was sufficient evidence to show that
she set out to manage the Page as an online community of the show's fans
rather than as a personal account.1 7 6 To the second factor, it is clear the
majority of the posts were business-related because they contained
exclusive material such as video clips and photographs. 7 7 There was no
evidence of Mattocks making posts unrelated to The Game, and it would be
safe to presume that most-if not all-of the posts had some sort of
connection to the show. The third factor equally points toward BET as the
licensee because, per the Letter Agreement, BET and its employees had full
administrative access and were able to post to the Page. 7 1 And, fourth, the
purpose of the Page was to promote dialogue about the show and,
eventually, to develop the show's brand.1 79 All four factors support BET's
interest in the account. Accordingly, BET should be declared the true
licensee of the Page, such that it could continue to interact with the six
million friends of the Page while not exposing itself to liability for any tort
claim connected to the property interest of the account, such as
conversion.so Even if the jurisprudential preference is to give more
173. See id. at 1315.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1316.
176. Id. at 1315 ("In 2008, when the Series was airing on CWN, Plaintiff Stacey
Mattocks created a Facebook Page focusing on the Series .....
177. Id. at 1316.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 1315-16. Once Mattocks contracted with BET to operate the account,
BET started to advertise the Page and placed its intellectual property on the Page. Id. at
1316. During this relationship, the amount of "likes" on the Page swelled to 6 million. Id.
Regardless of Mattocks' original intentions with the Page, once she agreed to work
part-time for BET by administering the Page, it clearly became a promotional tool for the
network. See id.
180. The claims for breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious
interference of contract could presumably move forward because those are specific to the
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protection to the individual managers of professional, mixed-use social
media accounts, this case presents a conflict that should clearly be decided
in favor of the business. The individual user was merely using the license
as an agent of the company.
These hypothetical analyses demonstrate a clear and fair approach for
settling password disputes among employers and employees. The two-step
framework requires resolution of just two questions: (1) By looking at the
face of the account, who is the presumptive licensee? (2) Does the actual
use of the account sufficiently demonstrate that the presumption is
incorrect?
CONCLUSION

By accepting that a social media account contains property interests
through its licensing scheme and adopting this two-step method for
determining the true licensee, courts will be able to efficiently dispose of
disputes concerning social media rights. With the increase in professional
social media usage,"' it is important for judicial economy that the courts
adopt a clear framework for addressing these conflicts. This approach
recognizes the value of a social media account and provides a method for
assigning control to the entity that was intended to be the beneficiary of the
labor that went into building the account. Accordingly, in the future, courts
should adopt this approach when facing disputes like the hypothetical
conflict posed in the introduction above.
This Comment ends with advice to employees and employers on how
to proceed regarding professional social media accounts. In each of the
cases that came before courts, none of the parties had signed contracts
regarding their social media accounts. If the parties had incorporated that
item into their employment contracts, they would not have needed to
proceed through litigation that was bound for murky waters. Employers
and employees both need to set clear expectations about who has the
superior rights to the network of clients and customers they spend so much
time and resources cultivating. Employers who want to claim an interest in
employees' professional social media accounts should adopt some
combination of the following three practices: (1) include provisions in
employment contracts that any license obtained by the employee in the
scope of the employee's employment is acquired on behalf of the
employer; (2) create the account and obtain the license, then allow the

transactions between BET and Mattocks and unrelated to the property interests attached to
the account at issue.
181. See supra Part I.
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employee to operate the account on the employer's behalf; or (3) mandate
that employees include sufficient information about the employer and use
their accounts primarily for company-specific purposes so that the
company could overcome any presumption of license ownership in favor of
the employee.
However, until businesses can adopt such practices, the inevitable
upward trend in litigation surrounding access to professional social media
accounts will continue. Per the discussion above, courts should adopt a
clear framework for addressing those issues. The framework of identifying
the true licensee by assigning presumptions based on the identity of the
account and then analyzing factors concerning the use of the account
presents the clearest solution. 8 2 Additionally, this proposed approach most
closely matches the way employers and employees think about their
interests in accounts. Only by adopting a universal framework will courts
be able to consistently answer whether followers will follow an employee
to a new job.
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